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JOINT OWNERSHIP OF CORPORATE
SECURITIES IN NORTH CAROLINA
MARK B. EDWARDS and RICHARD A. WOOD, JR.*
At the common law, the distinguishing incident of a joint ten-
ancy was the right of survivorship existing between the joint ten-
ants." This right, however, outlived its original social purpose
with the decline of the feudal tenure system,2 and was deemed alien
to the spirit of the early United States. Accordingly, the right of
survivorship as an incident of joint tenancy was abolished in North
Carolina by statute in 1784.3 Now codified as section 41-2 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, that statute provides that:
In all estates, real or personal, held in joint tenancy, the part of
any tenant dying shall not descend or go to the surviving tenant,
but shall descend or be vested in the heirs, executors, or admin-
istrators, respectively, of the tenant so dying, in the same manner
as estates held by tenancy in common. 4
Despite the 1784 statute, our supreme court early ruled that
parties to a contract may expressly provide for a right of survivor-
ship as to jointly owned property. In Taylor v. Smith,5 two sisters
had been given a promissory note in settlement of their father's
estate. The jury found from the evidence that the sisters had orally
* Members of the North Carolina Bar.1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 334-35 (Grant ed. 1941).
' The old common law favored joint tenancies, as against other classes
of concurrent ownership, because its policy was adverse to the division
of tenures, and the consequent multiplication of feudal services and
the weakening of the feudal relation. In joint tenancies, this did not
occur to any great extent, since the tenants were one person so far as
the lord was concerned. With the practical abolition of tenures, the
reason for such policy ceased....
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 284 (abr. ed. 1940).
'Act of 1784, ch. 204, § 6. Most states have statutes or judicial decisions
similar in effect, though some accomplish the same end by presuming a
tenancy in common unless a contrary intent appears or an estate in joint
tenancy is expressly declared. See discussion in text accompanying notes
43-84 infra.
'A proviso to the statute recognizes the right of survivorship for pur-
poses of winding up a partnership business and is covered in more detail by
the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 25 (2), codified in North Carolina as N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 59-55. See 2 LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAw § 125 (3d
ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as LEE].
- 116 N.C. 531, 21 S.E. 202 (1895).
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agreed that if either should die without a living heir, the survivor
would take the note. The supreme court affirmed a judgment on
the verdict for the surviving sister on the ground that the parties
had entered into a contractual right of survivorship supported by
mutual consideration,' pointing out that
the Act of 1784... abolishes survivorship where the joint tenancy
would otherwise have been created by the law, but does not oper-
ate to prohibit persons from entering into written contracts as
to land, or verbal agreements as to personalty, such as to make
the future rights of the parties depend upon the fact of survivor-
ship.
7
The contractual right of survivorship recognized in Taylor v.
Smith obtains, of course, only where it is found that a valid and
subsisting contract exists between the parties,' a matter not always
readily susceptible of proof. Modern day efforts to establish sur-
vivorship interests between joint owners typically arise in a non-
commercial, gratuitous context, i.e., between persons closely related
by kinship or affinity. In these instances, joint ownership is in-
tended to serve as a convenient substitute for a testamentary dis-
position.' This is especially so as to joint checking and savings
accounts, devices frequently used by persons of relatively modest
When the two sisters agreed with each other to hold the note, in
which each had an individual moiety as joint tenants subject to the
right of survivorship, these mutual rights of survivorship, when once
created, were assignable equities, constituting mutual considerations
sufficient to support the agreement.
Id. at 535, 21 S.E. at 204.
" Ibid. This analysis of the effect of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1950) has
been reaffirmed by the court on many occasions. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ervin,
227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947); Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N.C. 178,
7 S.E.2d 366 (1940).
' See note 6 supra. Co-owners of property can be deemed to have con-
tracted with reference to provisions affecting their rights of which they
were not aware. In Ervin v. Conn, 225 N.C. 267, 34 S.E.2d 402 (1945),
the court held that federal regulations incorporated by reference into United
States Government Series D Bonds governed disposition of the bonds upon
the death of one of the co-owners. See 2 LE:E § 127. The Ervin rule is in
accord with judicial decisions in most states as to co-owned United States
Government bonds. However, a small minority of cases hold that the United
States Treasury Regulations are for the protection of the Government and
do not control the rights of the co-owners inter partes. See Annot., 37
A.L.R.2d 1221 (1954). These latter decisions have been overruled by the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663
(1962).
For a discussion of a related device used in some states for this purpose,
see Christopher, Totten Trust: The Poor Mai's Will, 42 N.C.L. REv. 214
(1963).
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means. The same is true, to a lesser extent, of joint ownership of
corporate securities. Fortunately, the status of the former type of
"poor man's will" has been resolved by statute in North Carolina.'
Unfortunately, however, attempts by the unsophisticated and unin-
formed layman to create a valid right of survivorship in another
person with reference to corporate securities is, under the present
status of the law in North Carolina, very unlikely to be successful.
I. THE PROBLEM
In the typical transaction, Bascom Businessman and his wife
pool their separate incomes or he is the sole generator of family
income. Over a period of years, it becomes difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to separate the commingled funds of Bascom and his wife and
they never have occasion to think in such terms, at least absent
domestic difficulties. Bascom learns of a sound investment or the
ever-present "hot tip" and directs a broker to request issuance of
the stock to himself and his wife as "joint tenants with right of
survivorship and not as tenants in common," or conveys this desire
to the broker in less artful terms. Some brokers in North Carolina,
under direction from their legal counsel, either decline to request
issuance in this manner or advise against it. If, however, the stock
is so issued, Bascom probably, for the sake of convenience, has
the certificate sent to his office, where he keeps it with his other
personal papers. Alternatively, the stock may be issued, not in the
names of Bascom and his wife, but in the name of the brokerage
house, which will hold the certificate under the terms of an account
card. Less frequently, unlisted securities in closely held family cor-
porations will be gratuitously transferred by principal stockholders
into joint ownership with members of their family, without con-
sultation with any legal or financial counsel.
In any close approximation of the above factual situations, the
unsettled status of North Carolina law might well cause the personal
representative of the transferring or purchasing joint tenant to con-
test the validity of the purported right of survivorship. Such
challenges frequently result in difficulties, both legal and personal,
between the surviving joint tenant and residuary legatees or heirs
in intestacy and inevitably result in perplexed and unjustly blamed
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (Supp. 1965), enacted in 1959 and broadened
by amendment in 1963. See discussion in Part III in fra.
[Vol. 44
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attorneys, securities brokers and corporate fiduciaries serving as
executor, administrator and trustee. All these parties, upon reflec-
tion, are uncertain of their respective rights and responsibilities.
Why?
The first case in which the North Carolina Supreme Court
considered the question of joint ownership of corporate securities
was Jones v. Waldroup.1 ' In that case, decedent had owned seventy-
four shares of Blue Ridge Savings and Loan Association stock in
his own name. He had executed a paper writing that stated: "' [F] or
value received, I hereby transfer, set over and assign to R. M.
Waldroup [decedent], or Mrs. Hattie L. Waldroup [defendant],
either or the survivor, all my right, title and interest' " in the stock.'2
Decedent's administrator brought suit against the defendant, de-
cedent's widow, contending that the document executed by decedent
created only an agency in the defendant to have the certificates
transferred on the books of the corporation during decedent's
lifetime. Defendant testified that she had kept the Blue Ridge
certificates in her private desk at home.13 She had also alleged
ownership of the stock on the ground, supported by uncontroverted
evidence, that the stock had been purchased with her funds. The
trial judge instructed the jury that it should find for defendant if
the stock was purchased with her funds. The jury returned a ver-
dict for defendant.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed. The court first recog-
nized that a joint tenancy in personalty can be created by contract
11217 N.C. 178, 7 S.E.2d 366 (1940).
Id. at 180, 7 S.E.2d at 367. It is generally held, at common law and
under the UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER AcT §§ 1, 9 (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75,
-83), that transfer on the books of the corporation is not necessary to a
completed gift. See, e.g., lit re Antkowski's Estate, 286 II. App. 184, 3
N.E.2d 132 (1936); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 132 Ohio St. 21, 4 N.E.2d
917 (1936); In re Connell's Estate, 282 Pa. 555, 128 Atl. 503 (1925); 12A
FLETC HERa, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5684 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1957). More-
over, endorsement of the certificate or separate assignment to the donee is
unnecessary to a completed gift if delivery is made of the certificate to the
donee or his agent. See, e.g., In re Antkowski's Estate, supra; Bolles v.
Toledo Trust Co., supra; In re Connell's Estate, supra; 1 CHRISTY, TRANS-
FER OF STOCK § 53 (1958). Contra, cases cited in 1 CHRISTY, supra at 7:5
,n.3. Compare Scottish Bank v. Atkinson, 245 N.C. 563, 96 S.E.2d 837
(1957). See generally Modesett, Application of the Uniform Stock Trans-
fer Act to Gifts of Stock, 20 RocKY MT. L. REv. 67 (1947).
" The court did not regard this testimony as being violative of the
"Dead Man's Statute," now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1953), citing Thomp-
son v. Onley, 96 N.C. 9 (1887).
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-- "either bilateral agreement or gift"14-citing Taylor v. Smith.
The court construed the document executed by decedent "as creating
a common ownership in the property which is its subject until one
of them should die, with the right of survivorship." 5
Also involved in Waldroup were stock certificates in two other
associations, originally registered in each instance by decedent as
"R. M. Waldroup" but later re-registered at his request in the name
of "R. M. Waldroup or H. L. Waldroup." Defendant testified
that she had possession of these certificates also. An official of one
of the associations testified that the letter requesting re-registration
stated that "'I want both names so if anything should happen the
other would cash in without the usual red tape.' "" As to these
certificates the supreme court stated:
The title of the stock might be by assignment, without reference
to registry on the books of the company-which is good inter
partes-following which the legal title might be perfected by such
registry and delivery of the certificates .... But this is by no
means an exclusive method of transfer. It may be done by direc-
tion of the holder and owner of the stock upon the books of the
company which, followed by delivery, or a surrender of the
dominion of the certificates to the transferee, would make the
title complete .... The position of the defendant here is even
stronger, because Waldroup required the issue of new stock to
himself or wife, which was so registered upon the books of the
company, under his instructions, under circumstances which might
be evidence of a gift inter vivos, creating an estate for the com-
mon enjoyment of himself and wife, with the right of survivor-
ship upon the death of one of them.11
Obviously, the thrust of the court's opinion in Waldroup was
that it was confronted with the question of whether decedent had
made a completed gift of the stock. So viewing the case, the court
emphasized that evidence of donative intent had been offered in the
form of testimony as to decedent's statements to third persons and
that delivery had been shown by defendant's testimony as to her
possession of the certificates after re-registration or assignment.
The precedential value of Waldroup as a gift case is, however,
weakened by the recognition in the opinion that defendant had
11217 N.C. at 187, 7 S.E.2d at 371.
15 Id. at 187-88, 7 S.E.2d at 371.10 Id. at 182, 7 S.E.2d at 368.
17 Id. at 188, 7 S.E.2d at 371 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 44
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alternatively alleged, and offered evidence in support thereof, that
the certificates had been purchased by decedent with her funds.
Thus, the court could have based a decision upholding defendant's
ownership of the stock on the ground of a resulting trust.' s Indeed,
in a later analysis of its decision in Waldroup, the court emphasized
this aspect of the case. 9
The court in Waldroup avowedly left unanswered the pivotal
question of whether transfer on the books of the corporation into
the names of both proposed joint tenants would conclusively or
presumptively establish the crucial elements of a gift-evidence of
donative intent and delivery. Any doubt as to the court's opinion
on that question was, however, removed by its 1946 decision in
Buffaloe v. Barnes,"0 where the issue was squarely and unavoidably
presented to the court for the first time.
In Buffaloe, decedent purchased stock in Carolina Power and
Light Company, directing that the stock be issued to "David T.
Barnes [decedent] and Rossie Mae Barnes [decedent's niece] as
joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in com-
mon."' 2 ' Decedent's executor instituted suit for a declaratory judg-
"8 See, e.g., Wise v. Raynor, 200 N.C. 567, 157 S.E. 853 (1931) ; Wa-
chovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Black, 198 N.C. 219, 151 S.E. 269 (1930);
Deese v. Deese, 176 N.C. 527, 97 S.E. 475 (1918). Examination of the
briefs on appeal reveals that counsel for both parties viewed the principal
issue as whether a resulting trust was justified on the facts of the case.
See Brief for Appellant, p. 12; Brief for Appellee, p. 15.
"In Waldroup's case . . .the evidence tended to show that all the
stock was purchased by Dr. Waldroup with his wife's money. That
evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict to the effect that his
estate was not entitled to the stock. Harris v. Harris, 178 N.C. 7...
Very likely the jury answered the issues in Waldroup's case. . . as it
did because of the evidence to the effect that the wife's money was
used to purchase the stock.
Buffaloe v. Barnes, 226 N.C. 779-80, 39 S.E.2d 599, 600, denying rehearing
of 226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222 (1946).
20226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222, rehearing denied, 226 N.C. 778, 39 S.E.2d
599 (1946).
21 Since Carolina Power and Light Company is a North Carolina corpora-
tion, a potentially troublesome conflict of laws problem was avoided. At
common law, a distinction was made between a share in a corporation, which
was the ownership of a portion of the entity, and the share certificate,
which was simply the physical representation of the shares. Under the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, however,
the shares are merged into the certificates so that the certificates themselves
become in effect the shares. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Dickey, 161 La. 282, 108
So. 483 (1926); Salmon v. Moore, 238 Miss. 459, 118 So. 2d 867 (1960);
Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939). The adoption of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act or the Uniform Commercial Code in every
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ment as to ownership of the stock, joining as defendants decedent's
niece and the residuary legatees. Upon an agreed statement of facts
it appeared that the certificates were delivered to decedent; that he
placed them in his safety deposit box; that he had paid the con-
sideration for the stock; that the niece had endorsed a dividend
check over to him; and that, in the words of the court, "nor [was
there any] agreement between the parties in relation to the stock."22
The niece contended that there had been a gift inter vivos of the
stock and that upon her uncle's death she became sole owner by
survivorship. The residuary legatees contended that the niece was
entitled to only one-half of the stock, on the theory that section
41-2 of the North Carolina General Statutes converted a joint ten-
ancy into a tenancy in common and that, by virtue of the partition
statute, section 46-42, the decedent had retained the right to parti-
tion and, hence, had never relinquished control over the property
to the extent of his interest therein.23
The superior court held that the stock was the sole property of
the niece. On appeal by the residuary legatees, the supreme court,
in a decision from which two justices dissented, 4 held that the
agreed facts were insufficient to support the superior court's con-
clusion. The court pointed out, however, that the residuary legatees
had conceded the niece's ownership as to one-half of the stock, and
modified the judgment accordingly. Justice Devin, speaking for the
divided court, stated that:
The general rule is that where the owner or purchaser of shares
of stock has the certificate therefor issued in the name of another,
and so registered on the books of the corporation, though retain-
jurisdiction has virtually eliminated any distinction between share and
certificate, although local changes in these uniform acts may cast some
doubt upon the generality of this proposition. The modern rule, how-
ever, seems to be that when stock in a corporation created under
the law in one state is transferred in another, the law of the state
of the transfer governs the transaction and the resulting rights of the
parties inter se. Mylander v. Chesapeake Bank, 162 Md. 255, 159 AtI. 770
(1932); GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 162 (4th ed. 1964). Since Carolina
Power and Light Company is a North Carolina corporation and the purchase
by David Barnes took place in this state, the court was not called upon to
accept or reject this rule. Presumably, however, our court would follow the
majority rule.22226 N.C. at 317, 38 S.E.2d at 225.
22 This concession by the residuary legatees was, it would seem, unneces-
sary and unwise, for if there were no completed gift, the niece would not be
entitled to even one-half of the stock.
" Barnhill, J., dissented and was joined by Sewell, J.
[Vol. 44
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ing possession of the certificate, nothing else appearing, the trans-
action is regarded as a gift completed by constructive delivery....
But the rule is otherwise where the name of another is inserted
in the certificate for the owner's convenience . . . or where the
donor has not divested himself of right and title to the stock and
of all dominion and control over it35
The court concluded that upon the agreed facts there was insufficient
evidence of (1) intent to make a present gift and (2) donative
intent, to find as a matter of law that an inter vivos gift of the
stock had been made.
Turning first to the question of intent to make a present gift,
the court emphasized that:
The interest in the stock which might accrue to Rossie Mae
Barnes depended upon a contingency. The donor retained posses-
sion of the certificates, the evidence of title, and received the
dividends. Though the certificates were in the names of both as
joint tenants, the testator had the right at any time to segregate
his interest therein by partition. G.S. 46-42 . . . . The right of
control over the shares of stock at least as to one-half interest
therein was retained by the testator.26
The court's conclusions are, to say the least, anomolous, in light
of its recognition of the general rule that transfer on the books of
the corporation constitutes constructive delivery even though the
donor retains possession of the certificates. What is accomplished
by conceding that delivery is established by transfer on the books
but then holding that transfer, standing alone, is insufficient evi-
dence of intent to make a present gift even though no evidence
negating such intent is introduced ?27 Even more difficult to fathom
is the court's treating the donor's rights under the partition statute
as a continuation of his dominion over the stock. As the dissent
pointed out,2" the right of partition exists even though the donor
joint tenant is not in physical possession of the certificates. Thus,
" 226 N.C. at 318, 38 S.E.2d at 226 (citations omitted).
26 Id. at 319, 38 S.E.2d at 226.
See analysis in 25 N.C.L. REv. 91 (1946), noting the instant case.
,' [T]he fact that the testator had the right to petition for partition
has no bearing on the question of delivery and does not vary the
general rule that transfer on the books of the company constitutes
constructive delivery. It resided in the testator so long as he lived
whether he held the certificate or not and without regard to the por-
tion of the purchase price paid by him. The estate created and not the
retention of the certificate gave him the right.
226 N.C. at 324, 38 S.E.2d at 230.
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the donor joint tenant would, in a sense, retain dominion and control
over at least one-half of the stock even though the certificates are
tenant of his right to partition in order to remove a "dominion"
in the possession of the donee. To carry the court's position to its
logical extreme would require an express waiver by the donor joint
which is merely incidental to the relationship between the parties.
Certainly such a requirement would pass unnoticed by all donors
other than those advised by able legal or financial counsel and would
result in frustration of the donor's intent.
As to the lack of donative intent appearing from the agreed
facts, the court observed that
donative intent ... is not conclusively established by the use of
words in the face of a certificate of stock purporting to create a
joint tenancy with right of survivorship. To determine the req-
uisite intent to make a present gift of a joint interest requires
consideration of all the facts attendant upon the creation of the
purported interest.29
In considering a number of cases from other jurisdictions, the
court discussed at some length the Oregon case of Manning v.
United States Natl Bank."0 In that case, a husband surrendered
his solely owned bank stock and ordered a new certificate issued to
him and his wife "and upon the death of either, the survivor of
either." Both spouses signed a receipt for the stock at the bank,
and the husband took the certificate, telling his wife "'I will put
this away.' ,8 The Oregon court held that an inter vivos gift had
been made. Our court quoted from Manning as follows:
There is uncontradicted oral evidence tending to indicate that
the stock was transferred with donative intent, but we consider
the written instruments decisive on that issue .... the execution
of the joint receipt constitutes evidence of delivery to and ac-
ceptance by both.
32
Our court's reliance on Manning is especially interesting in light
of its previous observation that there was "no agreement between
the parties in relation to the stock."'33 The same statement may be
made of the factual situation in Waldroup insofar as there was not
Id. at 320, 38 S.E.2d at 227.174 Ore. 118, 148 P.2d 255 (1944).
01Id. at 125, 148 P.2d at 259.
226 N.C. at 320, 38 S.E.2d at 227, quoting from the Manning case, 174
Ore. at 131-32, 148 P.2d at 261.
" See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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a written agreement executed by both parties. Rather, decedent
had made a unilateral assignment of the stock certificates formerly
held in his own name. Thus, if Waldroup is to be regarded as a
gift case, it becomes fairly certain that, absent a written agreement
by both parties to the gift providing for survivorship, our court
would require transfer on the books of the corporation accompanied
by evidence of donative intent, intent to make a present gift, and
delivery to the donee indicating relinquishment of control by the
donor, in order to establish a right of survivorship by a completed
inter vivos gift.3 4 This analysis is supported by the court's further
elaboration of its decision in Buffaloe in its later memorandum de-
cision, expressly stated not to be binding on the court, denying a
rehearing of the case. 5 Conversely, it would seem that, if the donor
", If this be the law, it is squarely opposed to what the dissenting opinion
regarded as the majority and preferable rule, stated in the dissent as follows:
The stock as transferred on the books of the company creates an
estate for the common enjoyment of the joint tenants with the right
of survivorship upon the death of either. When the testator directed
that it be purchased and so transferred he put it beyond his power to
recall the gift or to sell, pledge, or give it away without the consent of
the other joint owner.
"There is a complete gift of corporate stock where, by the direction
of its owner, it has been transferred to the donee on the books of the
corporation, and a new certificate issued in the name of the donee,
or a certificate is issued in the first instance in the name of the donee,
although the certificate so issued is retained by the donor or the
corporation and not delivered to the donee." Cases cited, Anno., 99
A.L.R. 1080. Wherever it has been held to the contrary, decision was
made to turn upon some additional, unusual circumstance which
definitely disclosed that the donor at the time had no present intent to
make a gift.
226 N.C. 313, 323-24, 38 S.E.2d 222, 229 (dissenting opinion). It should be
pointed out, however, that the dissent's statements apply more specifically
to stock issued in the donee's name alone.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has never decided a case involving
the above question with reference to corporate securities or bank accounts.
However, in Copeland v. Craig, 193 S.C. 484, 8 S.E.2d 858 (1940), the
South Carolina Supreme Court was called upon to determine, under North
Carolina law, the effectiveness of such a transfer. In that case, the donor
had surrendered a certificate for one hundred shares of stock in Statesville
Cotton Mills, receiving in return a certificate for ten shares in his name
and a certificate for ninety shares in the name of his daughter. He retained
possession of both certificates until his death and received three of the four
dividends paid during that time. The South Carolina court concluded that
the law of North Carolina did not prohibit the finding that registration was
sufficient to pass title of the securities to the daughter even though the
donor retained possession of the certificate. This case was decided before
the North Carolina Supreme Court rendered its decision in the Buffaloe
case. Quaere whether the Copeland decision would have been the same in
light of the Buffaloe case.
"5In the case before us, there is no claim to ownership under a
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and donee execute a survivorship agreement with reference to the
jointly owned stock, as was done in Manning, there is no necessity
of producing further proof of the elements of a completed gift.
Indeed, it is arguable that the parties have then created a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship by contract rather than by gift.
The above analysis is supported by our court's holdings in the
joint bank account cases that have come before it. Between 1921
and 1952, five cases involving joint bank accounts were considered
by the court."' In each of these cases, the account was registered
in the name of "A or B," with no explicit reference to a right of
survivorship, and all deposits to the account were made by the
decedent. In each case, the court held that the account belonged to
the estate of the decedent on the ground that a completed gift had
not been made until the donee joint tenant exercised his or her
agency to make withdrawals, which agency was revocable at any
time by the donor and which terminated upon the donor's death."
The court's 1956 joint bank account decision in Bowling v.
Bowling8" was the first such case in which the court considered the
effect of an express agreement for survivorship. In Bowling, how-
ever, the court talked of contract rather than gift and upheld the
survivorship provision as to two accounts for which the parties had
signed a signature card, even though there was no showing as to
who had made deposits to the accounts. The court simply stated
that "since the parties have contracted and agreed that the savings
bilateral agreement, but only by gift inter vivos.... A joint tenancy
in stock with a provision for survival of ownership, where the donee
retains custody of the stock, nothing else appearing, in our opinion,
does not meet the definition of a gift inter vivos. The possession of
of a joint tenant is not that exclusive, absolute, and unconditional
possession contemplated in a gift inter vivos.
226 N.C. 778, at 780, 39 S.E.2d 599, at 600 (1946).
" Hall v. Hall, 235 N.C. 711, 71 S.E.2d 471 (1952); Redmond v. Farth-
ing, 217 N.C. 678, 9 S.E.2d 405 (1940) ; Nannie v. Pollard, 205 N.C. 362, 171
S.E. 341 (1933); Jones v. Fulbright, 197 N.C. 274, 148 S.E. 299 (1929);
Thomas v. Houston, 181 N.C. 91, 106 S.E. 466 (1921). See 31 N.C.L.
REV. 95 (1952); 8 N.C.L. REv. 73 (1929).
" See 2 LEE § 176. In comparing the holdings in these cases with
Waldroup, it is interesting to note that, in Waldroup, where certain of the
certificates had been registered in the name of "R. M. Waldroup or H. L.
Waldroup," there was additional evidence of a completed gift and the court
analyzed the case in terms of a gift rather than a revocable agency. It was
not deemed necessary by the court that the donee tenant obtain a re-transfer
on the books of the corporation and obtain registration in the donee's name
alone, an act analogous to withdrawal of funds from a joint savings account.
oB243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956). See 35 N.C.L. REV. 75 (1956).
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accounts ... were held by them 'as joint tenants with right of sur-
vivorship, and not as tenants in common,' the right of survivorship
existed." 9 However, another joint account involved in the case had
been opened by the surviving co-owner but no signature card had
been executed by the parties. There was no evidence concerning
the source of deposits other than that the initial deposit was made
from another joint account payable to "Dr. and/or Mrs. W. W.
Bowling or the survivor." The court held that one-half of the ac-
count belonged to the estate of the deceased joint tenant, even though
the survivor had usually had physical possession and control of the
passbook and had made all the withdrawals.
The court's emphasis on the need of an executed signature card,
notwithstanding the designation of the account, was most force-
fully made in a 1960 bank account case, Wilson County v. Wooten.4
In that case, the court held that the surviving co-owner under a
joint savings account covered by signature card was entitled to the
balance in the account, to the exclusion of creditors of the decedent's
insolvent estate, even though the decedent had made all the deposits
to the account. The court did not discuss the effect, if any, of the
right of the joint tenants to partition the account, a point agonized
over in Buffaloe, nor did it discuss the question of consideration
for the "contract" on the part of the surviving joint tenant, as it
had in Taylor v. Smith.
If our court is to be consistent, it would seem clear that, based
upon the more recent bank account cases, 41 the court would have to
hold, if ever presented the question, that the execution of a broker-
age account card or a similar agreement between the parties them-
selves would conclusively establish the right of survivorship regard-
less of which tenant had furnished the funds, had cashed dividend
30 243 N.C. at 520, 91 S.E.2d at 180.
The leading modern case involving joint bank accounts is Matthew v.
Moncrief, 135 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1943). Vinson, J., surveyed cases from
many states and pointed out that, where signature cards had been executed
by both tenants, the joint tenancy was upheld by some courts on a con-
tractual theory, while other courts have upheld it as a completed inter vivos
gift.40251 N.C. 667, 111 S.E.2d 875 (1960).
41 See also Smith v. Smith, 255 N.C. 152, 120 S.E.2d 575 (1961). In
that case a wife sued her estranged husband for one-half of the money in
bank accounts registered in joint names with explicit provision for right of
survivorship. The court held that while a right of survivorship could be
created by contract, such contracts were not enforceable by the alternate
against the bank while both parties were living.
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checks or had retained custody and control of the certificates.4 2
Until such a result is obtained from the court, however, attorneys,
personal representatives, brokers and securities owners must assume
that inquiry is necessary as to the details of the transfer to determine
the source of the funds and the circumstances of the transfer, in
order to determine after the fact whether a completed gift had been
made. If, in the course of such inquiry, it appears that there is no
signed agreement, it would be a rare factual situation indeed that
would still permit the conclusion, based upon evidence that would
be admissible in litigation, that a completed gift had been made.
Such uncertainty discourages the use of joint tenancies with right
of survivorship in corporate securities, a device that could be of
genuine usefulness in handling the personal affairs of many persons.
II. APPROACHES OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. In General
The uncertainty surrounding the creation of a joint tenancy in
corporate securities in North Carolina is found in few other juris-
dictions. Many states have approached the problem directly and by
statute have made clear the status of this form of ownership.4 3 In
others, the courts have upheld gifts in factual situations indistin-
guishable from Buffaloe, even though such a result was not com-
pelled by rules of law peculiar to the jurisdiction.44
Most states, including those in which the courts have upheld
gifts of survivorship interests in stock, have made judicial or legis-
lative inroads on the right of survivorship that was the prime inci-
dent of a common law joint tenancy. Though three different
approaches have been utilized, the basic result is the same in all.
The first approach-the North Carolina approach-has been a legis-
lative abolition of the right of survivorship as an incident of joint
" If shares of corporate stock are desired with the right of survivor-
ship, it would seem that a good way to achieve this result would be
to register the shares on the books of the corporation in the names of
"A and B as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common" and then proceed to spell out expressly in a
separate agreement signed by both co-owners, the right of survivor-
ship. Any kind of real or personal property may be held as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship under the provisions of an
express contract.
2 LE § 126, at 119.
," See text accompanying notes 65-74 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 53-63 infra.
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tenancy. The North Carolina statute provides that all property so
held shall descend and vest upon the death of the first dying tenant
as if held as tenants in common. 5  Only four states-Georgia,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Tennessee4 8-have enacted simi-
lar statutes. The courts in each state, however, have held that a
right of survivorship can be added to a joint estate by contract be-
tween the parties."' As in Taylor v. Smith," the problem is to
determine what constitutes a sufficient contract.
The statutes in a majority of states, however, simply presume
that every joint tenancy is a tenancy in common. 9 A typical ex-
ample of statutes following this approach is that of the District of
Columbia:
Every estate granted or devised to two or more persons in their
own right, including estates granted to husband and wife, shall
be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared to be a joint
tenancy; .... r0
Under such statutes, the presumption of tenancy in common is re-
butted by clear evidence of a contrary intent. Each court must
decide for itself what facts suffice to give this "clear evidence."
In still other states, the courts themselves have ruled that a
joint tenancy may be created only by "express language" and "clear
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1950).
" See GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1002 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 121(1950); S.C. CODE § 19-55 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-107 (1955).
' See Equitable Loan & Sec. Co. v. Waring, 117 Ga. 599, 44 S.E. 320(1903); In re Wright's Estate, 348 Pa. 76, 34 A.2d 57 (1943); Davis v.
Davis, 223 S.C. 182, 75 S.E.2d 46 (1953); Runion v. Runion, 186 Tenn. 25,
207 S.W.2d 1016 (1947).
"116 N.C. 531, 21 S.E. 202 (1895).
"The jurisdictions adopting such statutes are: Alabama, ALA. CODE, tit.
47, § 19 (1958); Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-204 (1956); Cali-
fornia, CAL. CIVIL CODE § 683; District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-
816 (1961); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.15 (1944); Hawaii, HAWAII
REV. LAWS § 345-2 (1955); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-104 (1948);
Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 76, § 2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); Indiana,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-104(a) (1951); Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
58-501 (Supp. 1961) ; Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 381.120, 381.130 (1960) ;
Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE, art. 50, § 9 (1964); Montana, MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 67-308, -313 (1962); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.085(1959); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-17 (1940); Oklahoma, OKuLA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 60, § 74 (1963); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
34-3-1 (1956); South Dakota, S.D. CODE § 51.0212 (Supp. 1960); Texas,
TEx. PROB. CODE § 46 (Supp. 1964); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-20, -21(1959); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (Supp. 1963); West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3539, 3540 (1961).
" D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-816 (1961).
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intent."'" The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has stated
the presumption as follows:
It needs only be mentioned that in this State joint tenancies are
not favored in the law, and that even when a joint tenancy is
created it does not, as at common law, carry with it the incident
of survivorship. If the latter factor is to be joined to the estate
created, it must be done by a definite provision in that regard.5 2
In such a jurisdiction, each case must be examined on its facts to
ascertain whether the requisite intent exists.
B. Judicial Decisions
The three approaches set forth above are basically similar. In
each, the question for decision is whether the parties so clearly in-
tended to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship that their
actions can be said to constitute a "contrace' or the requisite "clear-
ly expressed intent." In the Buffaloe case, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court took the position that, absent a contract, the right of
survivorship can be established only when the elements of an inter
vivos gift are present. Of the three elements-intent, delivery and
acceptance--the element of delivery and the resulting lack of domin-
ion has proved most troublesome to the court. The court's difficulties
have not, however, been compelled by the facts in the gift cases before
it nor by the North Carolina statutory background. Indeed, several
courts in other states, faced with indistinguishable facts and similar
rules of law, have found the requisite delivery and upheld the joint
tenancy with survivorship.
In the Maryland case of Allender v. Allender,5 3 a father placed
shares of stock in his closely held corporation in his name and the
1 This judicial presumption appears to have been adopted in the follow-
ing jurisdictions: Connecticut: Houghton v. Brantingham, 86 Conn. 630, 86
At. 664 (1913); Delaware: Shore v. Milby, 31 Del. Ch. 49, 64 A.2d 36
(1949); Iowa: Stonewall v. Danielson, 204 Iowa 1367, 217 N.W. 456
(1928); Massachusetts: Battles v. Millbury Say. Bank, 250 Mass. 180, 145
N.E. 55 (1924); Mississippi: Cross v. O'Cavanagh, 198 Miss. 137, 21 So.
2d 473 (1945); Missouri: Opinion of the Attorney General, July 21, 1950;
Nebraska: It re Estate of Johnson, 116 Neb. 686, 218 N.W. 789 (1928);
New Hampshire: Pierce v. Baker, 58 N.H. 531 (1879); New York: Over-
heiser v. Lackey, 207 N.Y. 229, 100 N.E. 738 (1913); Oregon: Manning
v. United States Nat'l Bank, 174 Ore. 118, 148 P.2d 255 (1944) ; Wisconsin:
Farr v. Trustees of Grand Lodge, 83 Wis. 446, 53 N.W. 738 (1892).
" State Bank & Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 317, 130 Atl. 483,
486 (1925).
.: 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952).
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names of each of his four children "jointly and to survivor."
Making no mention of this act to his children, he placed the newly
issued certificates in his safe deposit box and continued until his
death to receive the dividends on all shares and to exercise all voting
rights. Upon his death, his widow brought suit to set aside the
transfers. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the surrender
of the old certificates and the issuance of the new ones was an act
sufficient to effect a completed transfer of the interest to the dece-
dent's children. The court found all the elements of an inter vivos
gift.5 4 Donative intent was seen in the act of a father putting equal
number of shares jointly in his name and the name of each of his
children. Delivery was accomplished when decedent placed the new-
ly issued certificates in his safe deposit box since, in the eyes of the
court, the possession of one joint tenant is the possession of both.
The remaining element of a gift-acceptance by the donees-was
presumed since the transfer was beneficial to them. The fact that
the donor retained the certificates, voted the shares, received the
dividends and had a statutory right of partition was not sufficient
to vitiate the effectiveness of the gift. Said the court: "In the in-
stant case it is clear that the donor retained no legal control over
the devolution of the joint interest at his death and no power to
revoke or undo what he had done, .... ""
On similar facts, the South Dakota court upheld a daughter's
rights of survivorship in stock her father had had issued in their
names "as Jt. Wr. of Surv & not as tenants in common."" After
finding donative intent from the facts and stating that acceptance
was to be presumed in a gift from parent to child, the court said:
Although donor retained possession of the certificate, he surren-
dered his exclusive dominion and control thereof when he had
"' The court of appeals regarded the question as whether a present gift
to the children had been consummated and did not even refer to the Mary-
land statute governing the creation of joint tenancies. That statute, sub-
stantially unchanged in its current form, provides that no joint estate shall
be a joint tenancy unless "it is expressly provided" in writing that such
is intended. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 9 (1964).
r 199 Md. at 549, 87 A.2d at 612. Compare with this rationale, the
language of the North Carolina court in Buffaloe, quoted in text accompany-
ing note 26 supra.
" Bunt v. Fairbanks, 134 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1965).
This case was decided under S.D. CoDE § 51.0212 (Supp. 1960), which
provides, in pertinent part: "A joint tenancy interest is one owned by several
persons in equal shares, by a title created by a single . . . transfer, when
expressly declared in the ... transfer to be a joint tenancy .... "
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ownership placed in defendant and himself. Nothing more re-
mained to be done to make the gift complete and absolute. It was
irrevocable. Each co-owner had an equal right to possession of
the certificate and since they could not both have manual posses-
sion at the same time, possession by one cotenant is, in contempla-
tion of law, possession of both.57
In the case of In re Johnson's Estate58 the decedent obtained
certificates of deposit in four banks made to himself or his wife
and placed them in his safe deposit box. Although the wife knew
of their existence, she never had possession of the certificates. The
Nebraska court held that Mrs. Johnson was the owner of the
certificates of deposit by virtue of her right of survivorship, empha-
sizing the transferor's intent rather than delivery:
In those cases in which the question is disposed of on the gift
theory a long technical discussion is engaged in as to whether or
not there could be a delivery sufficient to meet the common-law
requirement of a gift where the donor retained possession of the
certificate of deposit or the passbook; .... Practically all of such
decisions finally turn on the question of the intention of the
donor, and that is the rule in this state.59
Still another rationale is presented in the Ohio case of In re
Hutchison's Estate."' Decedent purchased twenty-five shares of
stock with funds taken from a joint bank account. The shares
were registered in the name of him and his wife "as tenants in
common of individed equal interests for their respective lives, re-
mainder in the whole to their survivor." In an action to determine
the effectiveness of this registration, the Ohio court considered the
problem as one of contract:
The problem is therefore reduced to the simple question whether
the parties have used apt language to express their purpose, and,
if so, whether the contract is valid and enforceable under the laws
of this state.
It would be difficult to frame language which would be more apt,
7 134 N.W.2d at 3.
Again compare the language of the North Carolina Supreme Court
quoted in text accompanying note 26 supra.
116 Neb. 686, 218 N.W. 739 (1928).
Id. at 688, 218 N.W. at 740. Compare Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C.
515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956); Wilson County v. Wooten, 251 N.C. 667, 111
S.E.2d 875 (1960). In these bank account cases, our court departed from
its previous rationale of agency and gave effect to the intent of the depositor
by allowing survivorship where the intent was clearly expressed.00 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929).
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and which would more clearly express an intention by each of
the parties to make an irrevocable grant of his undivided one-half
interest in the stock to the other, to take effect upon the death
of either.6 1
With reference to the validity of the contract, the court said:
"If . . . a donor or grantor, by the operative words of the gift or
grant, clearly expresses an intention to give the right of survivor-
ship, such words will not be disregarded." 62 A valid right of sur-
vivorship was found to have been created.13
These cases represent but four of the jurisdictions that have
judicially considered and approved the creation of a right of sur-
vivorship in corporate securities." The rationales of the courts
differ. Some emphasize the elements of an inter vivos gift; some
emphasize the donor's intent; others analyze the question as one of
contract. Other states, however, perhaps fearful of these diverse
and ofttimes conflicting rationales or perhaps too impatient to await
judicial decisions, have enacted statutes designed to furnish more
definite guidelines in this area.
C. Existing Legislation
The types of statutes enacted are almost as numerous as the
legislatures enacting them, but a representative example is that of
Ohio:
A joint estate with the incidents of a joint estate as at common
law, including the right of survivorship, may be created in shares
by executing and delivering a certificate therefor to two or more
persons with the words "as joint tenants" or "as joint tenants
62Id. at 545, 166 N.E. at 688-89.
0 2 Id. at 552, 166 N.E. at 691.
" Compare this result with the action of the North Carolina Supreme
Court in the Bowling case. There securities were registered in the name
of "William W. Bowling and Mrs. Agnes Paulk Bowling, as joint tenants
with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common." With no discus-
sion of their action, the court awarded one-half of the securities to each
party. A right of survivorship was recognized, however, in bank accounts
the signature cards of which contained identical language.
" The other jurisdictions having such holdings include: Colorado:
Eisenhardt v. Lowell, 105 Colo. 417, 98 P.2d 1001 (1940); Illinois: Frey v.
Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962), 51 ILL. B.J. 826 (1963);
Iowa: Hyland v. Standiford, 253 Iowa 294, 111 N.W.2d 260 (1961);
Missouri: Bunker v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mo. 305, 73
S.W.2d 242 (1934) ; Wisconsin: Zander v. Holly, 1 Wis. 2d 300, 84 N.W.2d
87 (1957).
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with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common" fol-
lowing their names .... 05
In a straightforward manner, this statute declares that the use of
certain specified words will create a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship. The creation of this tenancy is not elective; the use
of the statutory phraseology creates a right of survivorship whether
or not intended. For the unsophisticated purchaser of stocks, such
a statute may produce property rights totally foreign to his intent.
In spite of this danger for those who unknowingly register securi-
ties in joint names at the advice of friends or acquaintances, this
statute has the virtues of certainty, simplicity and clarity. There
is no ambiguity in its language and the rights of parties under it
are well defined. Perhaps because of these virtues, this type of
statute is found in several other jurisdictions.
In Colorado, the statute is quite similar,6 except it is expressly
provided that the words "joint tenancy" or "joint tenants" will
suffice; words of survivorship are not required. The Arkansas
statute 7 states that stock certificates issued to two or more persons
with the word "or" between the names shall be held in a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship. This statute is declared to be
applicable only to Arkansas corporations, but it is believed that its
policy would apply to the corporate securities of foreign corpora-
tions.6 8
The Michigan statute 9 provides that stock certificates registered
in the name of persons who are husband and wife shall be held as
joint tenants with right of survivorship. No provision is made for
persons other than husband and wife. Since corporate securities are
most commonly held jointly by husband and wife, however, such a
limited statute eliminates much uncertainty70
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.24(D) (Page 1964).
"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-1-5 (1963).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-225 (Supp. 1963).
See Jensen v. Houseby, 207 Ark. 742, 182 S.W.2d 758 (1944). See also
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-434 (1964) (same jurisdictional limitation).
" Micr. STAT. ANN. § 26-211 (1957). This section provides: "All bonds,
certificates of stock, . . . or other evidences of indebtedness hereafter made
payable to persons who are husband and wife, . . . shall be held by such
husband and wife in joint tenancy unless otherwise therein expressly pro-
vided, . .. with full right of ownership by survivorship in case of the death
of either." (Emphasis added.)
10 In those states recognizing tenancy by the entireties in personal prop-
erty, the problems created by joint ownership of corporate securities is
similarly alleviated. Jurisdictions recognizing such estates are Arkansas,
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Like the basic Ohio statute, the Maine legislature provided that
shares registered in two or more names "as joint tenants or under
language indicating the intention that said property be held with the
right of survivorship" shall be deemed a true joint tenancy.71 The
legislature recognized, however, that it would be desirable to achieve
uniformity between shares purchased prior to the statute and those
purchased afterwards. Accordingly, the statute provides that shares
issued before the effective date of the statute could be brought under
its provisions by filing with the corporation or its transfer agent
an agreement stating a desire to be subject to its provisions. 2 This
eliminates possible questions of impairment of contracts, but still
allows present stockholders to benefit from the provisions of the
statute should they so desire.
Whereas the Ohio statute and its variants provide that the use
of certain words or phrases will automatically give rise to a joint
tenancy, the New Mexico approach is clearly different. That statute
provides:
An instrument conveying or transferring title to real or personal
property to two or more persons as joint tenants, to two or more
persons and to the survivors of them and the heirs and assigns
of the survivor, or to two or more persons with right of survivor-
ship, shall be prima facie evidence that such property is held in
a joint tenancy and shall be conclusive as to purchasers or en-
cumbrancers for value. In any litigation involving the issue of
such tenancy a preponderance of the evidence shall be sufficient
to establish the same.73
Such a statute successfully avoids the objection raised to the abso-
lute statutes previously discussed. Under Ohio law, for example,
securities registered with the words "joint tenants" are deemed to
be held in such tenancy. Under the New Mexico statute, however,
the shareholder who inadvertently agrees to such registration or
whose shares are so registered by a well-meaning transfer agent
could introduce evidence at a later time to rebut the presumption
of joint tenancy. Unfortunately this opportunity to rebut the pre-
sumed right of survivorship is also available to any disgruntled heirs
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, Maryland, Pennsyl-
vania, Tennessee and Vermont. See Rogers, Joint Ownership of Corporate
Stock, 13 U. PiTT. L. REv. 498 (1952).
71 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 42 (1954).
' ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 43, 44 (1954).7' N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-1-14.1 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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or creditors. The mere presence of this opportunity can stimulate
long and costly litigation even though there is little reason to believe
the presumption will be rebutted.
A Wyoming statute" provides that, upon the death of a person
who held any property as a joint tenant, any person interested in
the property may file an affidavit in the county where the property
is located describing the property and the instrument creating the
joint estate and certifying under oath to the death of the joint
tenant. The next section then provides:
Each affidavit aforesaid, whether heretofore or hereafter signed,
sworn to and recorded, substantially in compliance with the pro-
visions of this act, [§§ 34-98, 34-99] shall constitute prima facie
evidence that all facts recited therein are true for the purpose of
such legal effect as may result therefrom by operation of law.75
The statute does not, however, contain any provision concerning the
legal consequences of such ownership. Interested parties still must
determine the legal rights established under the instrument creating
the joint estate. In making such a determination, it is prima facie
established only that the instrument is in existence and that one of
the joint owners is deceased.
In at least one state, Illinois, the courts have seized upon a
statute seemingly unrelated to the question and made it applicable.
Chapter 76, section 2(b) of the Illinois statutes7 provides that,
where securities are registered in two or more names as joint tenants
with right of survivorship, a corporation and its transfer agents
may, upon the death of one of the tenants, treat the survivor as
sole owner of the securities. Such statutes are relatively common,"7
but by their terms seem only to protect the corporation from liability
and not to govern the rights of parties inter se.78 In the case of
' Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-98 (1959).
"'Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-99 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
" ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 76, § 2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964).
" See, e.g., ARIZ. R-v. STAT. ANN. § 10-175.01 (1956); CAL. CoRP.
CODE § 2414; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-59(3) (1965); TEX. IBv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 1302-6.04 (Supp. 1964); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23.01.225
(Supp. 1965).
" Similar statutes have been enacted to allow a bank to pay the balance
of a joint account to the survivor of the depositors without liability. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 76, § 2(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 53-146 (1965). Decisions under such statutes generally hold that
they are solely for the protection of the bank and do not affect the rights
of the depositors between themselves. See, e.g., Jones v. Fulbright, 197
N.C. 274, 148 S.E. 229 (1929). A similar rationale would probably apply
to the stock statutes.
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Frey v. Wubbena,0 however, the Illinois court regarded the statute
as establishing a statutory method of creating a joint tenancy. In
the Frey case, stocks had been registered in the name of a father
and his daughters. After his death, his second wife attempted to
set aside the purported joint tenancies. In denying her action, the
court said:
A statutory right of survivorship exists and we think it unneces-
sary to follow the principles of common law joint tenancy whether
an agreement has been signed by the parties or not. The registra-
tion of stock ownership upon the books of the corporation in
appropriate statutory language is sufficient to vest legal title,
subject to divestment if the circumstances surrounding the trans-
action warrant it.80
Later Illinois cases have followed this decision,a ' creating a rule of
law that almost certainly extends the statute beyond the intent of
the Illinois legislature.
In only four of the fifty states are there substantial roadblocks
to the creation of joint tenancies with right of survivorship in
corporate securities; North Carolina is one of the four.a In some
jurisdictions, the creation has been sanctioned by judicial decisions
"' 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962).
:oId. at 69, 185 N.E.2d at 854-55.
81 See Houswerth v. Gill, 40 Ill. App. 2d 281, 189 N.E.2d 409 (1963);
Lytle v. Northern Trust Co., 39 Ill. App. 2d 372, 188 N.E.2d 743 (1963);
In the Matter of Estate of Cronholm, 38 Ill. App. 2d 141, 186 N.E.2d 534
(1962).
"2 The other three states are Louisiana, Texas and Washington. In
Louisiana, the attorney general has ruled that joint tenancies with right of
survivorship are invalid because there is no statutory authority for its
existence, because it would violate the formalities required for wills, and
because it would defeat the civil law system of forced heirs. See 1944-46
LA. Op. ATT'y GEN. 104 (1946). The problems in Texas and Washington
arise out of the community property system there in force. Texas passed a
statute attempting to solve its problem but constitutional difficulties have
arisen and are as yet unresolved. See Orgain, The Texas Joint Tenancy in
Corporate Shares: Problems of the Stock Transfer Agent, 16 BAYLOR L.
REv. 99 (1964). A 1963 Washington statute permits the creation of a joint
tenancy by written instrument, WAsn. REV CODE ANN. § 64.28.010 (Supp.
1965), but recent legislation effectively emasculates it. The 1965 legislature
enacted a statute protecting a corporation from liability in treating jointly
issued stock as a valid joint tenancy if the surviving spouse submits, among
other things, an affidavit to the effect that the shares were community prop-
erty, that no proceedings have been begun or are contemplated to probate a
will of the decedent, and that all creditors have been satisfied, WAsH. RBv.
CODE ANN. § 23-.--[34] (Supp. 1965), effective midnight, June 31, 1967.
Since such an affidavit will almost certainly be required by the corporation
before making transfer, only those few persons meeting its requirements may
obtain transfer without long and difficult processes.
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that, by various rationales, have approved such estates . 3 In other
states, statutes in numerous variations govern the creation and inci-
dents of a joint tenancy in stocks. 84 The stockholders, attorneys,
fiduciaries and brokers in North Carolina can wait and hope that
the next decision of our supreme court will approve the creation of
a survivorship interest in corporate securities by some reasonable
and practicable method. A more certain and a more immediate
solution can be attained, however, in the form of a legislative
enactment.
III. SUGGESTED LEGISLATION FOR NORTi CAROLINA
A legislative proposal frequently represents a value judgment by
its proponents that any existing judicial decisions on the subject
are unsatisfactory, either in their clarity or in the result obtained.
Such value judgments abound in suggesting a legislative definition
of the rights of persons seeking to own corporate securities as joint
tenants with right of survivorship. Is such ownership desirable?
If so, what inter vivos incidents, if any, should attach to such owner-
ship? What rights should creditors of one of the joint tenants have
in the jointly owned securities? Like the joint bank account, the
joint tenancy of corporate securities is an effort to establish a new
form of ownership to accomplish the intent and desires of the
parties. As is frequently the case, the "new wine" does not easily
fit into the "old vessels" of established legal principles and rules
of law.
Fully realizing these problems, the authors suggest the following
legislative means by which those persons who desire to own cor-
porate securities as joint tenants with right of survivorship can be
assured of accomplishing that end, while having clearly specified
their rights and those of their creditors in the jointly owned securi-
ties.
Section 1. Corporate securities held in joint tenancy with
right of survivorship.-(a) The registration of certificates of
stock in corporations, corporate bonds, corporate debentures and
other corporate securities, not including shares in building and
loan associations, in the name of two or more parties as "joint
tenants" or "joint tenants with right of survivorship" or "joint
tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in com-
" See cases cited note 51 supra.
"See statutes cited notes 65-77 supra.
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mon" shall be deemed to create a joint tenancy with reference
to the securities so registered having the incidents set forth in
subsection (b) of this section. This section shall be applicable
even though said securities may have been transferred directly
by a person to himself with another or other persons.
(b) A joint tenancy in corporate securities created under this
section shall have the following incidents:
(1) Upon any partition under Article 4 of Chapter 46 of
the General Statutes of securities held as joint tenants under
this section, or upon a sale of any such securities, said securi-
ties or the proceeds therefrom shall be divided among the
parties in proportion to their contribution to the purchase
price thereof. In the event their respective contributions
are not determined, the securities or proceeds therefrom
shall be deemed owned by both or all equally.
(2) During the lifetime of both or all the parties:
(a) All cash dividends or interest payable with refer-
ence to said securities shall be their separate property
to the extent of the interest to which each of said parties
would be entitled upon a partition under subsection (1) ;
(b) All stock dividends or dividends in kind payable
with reference to said securities shall be held as joint
tenants under this section;
(c) All dividends or interest with reference to said
securities shall be made payable or issued jointly unless
the parties authorize the corporation to make such pay-
ments or issuance otherwise;
(d) All voting rights with reference to said securities
shall be exercised by all the parties subject to the pro-
visions of G.S. 55-69(f).
(e) All transfers of said securities shall be made by
joint act of all tenants.
(3) During the lifetime of both or all the parties, said
securities shall be subject to the respective debts of the
parties to the extent of the interest to which each of the
parties would be entitled upon a partition under subsection
(1). In the event a portion of said securities are subjected
to the debts of one or more of the parties, the remaining
securities shall continue to be held as joint tenants under this
section.
(4) Upon the death of either or any tenant, the survivor
or survivors shall become the sole owner or owners of the
remaining securities. Where two or more tenants survive,
the proportionate share of the decedent shall be allocated to
the survivors in equal shares.
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(c) This section shall be subject to the provisions of law appli-
cable to transfers in fraud of creditors.
(d) Nothing herein contained shall be construed to repeal or
modify any of the provisions of G.S. 105-11 and 105-24 relating
to the administration of the inheritance laws or any provisions of
the law relating to inheritance taxes.
(e) This section shall not be deemed exclusive; securities not
registered in conformance with this section shall be governed by
other applicable provisions of law.
(f) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any securi-
ties registered as provided in subsection (a) which were issued
prior to the effective date of this section, unless the persons in
whose names said securities have been issued shall execute and
file with the corporation issuing such securities or with its trans-
fer agent or registrar an agreement indicating that this section
shall apply.
A written agreement in substantially the following form shall
be sufficient to secure the application of this section:
W e ..................... ..................... and
.................. , owners of ........ shares of (specify
security) of (specify corporation), represented by certifi-
cate number(s) ......... hereby agree that our ownership
in the above-mentioned securities shall be as joint tenants
with right of survivorship in accordance with North Caro-
lina General Statutes Section .........




Section 2. Effective date.-This Act shall become effective
on ............. 19 .....
Those familiar with the North Carolina bank account statute85
will find much similarity between that legislation and the above pro-
posal. The authors feel that the legislative policy decisions found
in the bank account statute are generally sound, representing a fair
and practical balancing of the competing interests of the depositors
and their creditors. Changes from the mechanics and policy de-
cisions of that statute are occasioned by the intrinsic differences
between bank accounts and corporate securities and the circum-
stances under which they are utilized.
The touchstone of the proposed statute is its provision in sub-
section (a) that the act of registering corporate securities on the
8
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (Supp. 1965).
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corporate books in the names of two or more persons as "joint
tenants" or "joint tenants with right of survivorship" or "joint
tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common"
establishes a joint tenancy between those persons as to the securities.
The equivocal registration of securities only in the names of two
or more persons without the words set forth in the statute does not
create a joint tenancy. Shares in building and loan associations are
not covered by the statute, since they are included within the defini-
tion of "deposit account" in our bank account statute.s 6
The concluding sentence of subsection (a) avoids a potential
problem created by rigid application of the common-law principles
relating to creation of a joint tenancy. Two of the vital unities of
the joint tenancy at common law are those of time and titleY7
Accordingly, many courts have held that a conveyance from A to
"A and B as joint tenants" creates a tenancy in common.8   Our
supreme court does not appear to have ruled on this question, though
it has recognized that one spouse can convey realty to both spouses
without the intervention of a third party "strawman" and create a
tenancy by the entireties.8 9 The -1957 General Assembly confirmed
the court's holding. ° The concluding sentence of subsection (a)
insures that no question will arise as to the propriety of transfer
and re-registration of corporate securities directly from the name of
one owner to himself and one or more other joint tenants. 91
Subsection (f) of the proposed statute adopts the salutary pur-
pose of the comparable Maine statute92 in avoiding any possible
objection that application of the statute to jointly registered securi-
ties acquired prior to enactment of the statute would be an uncon-
stitutional impairment of the vested contractual rights of one or
more of the parties.9 3 In order to make the statutory incidents of
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (e) (2) (Supp. 1965).
" Burton v. Cahill, 192 N.C. 505, 135 S.E. 332 (1926); 4 THoMPsoN,
REAL PROPERTY § 1777 (repl. ed. 1961).
8" See cases collected in Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 595 (1955); 4 T:ROMPSON,
op. cit. supra note 87; 8 DE PAUL L. REV. 422 (1959); 48 MicH. L. REv.
1034 (1950).
89Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 94 S.E.2d 466 (1956).90N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.3 (Supp. 1965).
9 The same legislative end would be accomplished by amending § 39-13.3
of the General Statutes to include conveyances of personalty.
92 See text accompanying note 72 supra.
" See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodard, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819). But see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934). See generally Schmidt, Constitutional Limitations Upon Legislative
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joint ownership of corporate securities applicable to securities issued
in joint names prior to enactment of the statute, the owners must
execute and file with the corporation or its transfer agent or regis-
trar an agreement indicating their desire and intent to subject their
relationship to the statutory provisions. Such a procedure appears
simpler and more meaningful than a formalistic re-registration
without change in named owners made after the statute becomes
effective. Subsection (f) sets forth a suggested form of the agree-
ment required, its essence being an adequate description of the se-
curities and a reference to the statute. Since the effective date of
the statute is so important, section two specifies that date to
assist those many persons who will be interested in the statute but
who will be unfamiliar with the general statutory provision that an
act becomes effective thirty days after the adjournment of the Gen-
eral Assembly session in which the act is passed.94
Subsection (b) sets forth the incidents of a joint tenancy estab-
lished under subsections (a) or (f)." The basic policy of the North
Carolina bank account statute is followed, with some modifications
and elaborations. The incidents of the joint tenancy are self-ex-
planatory, though an analysis of the underlying policy decisions
would seem appropriate. Basically, the statute declares that joint
ownership of corporate securities is ambulatory until the death of
one of the tenants-i.e., that the survivor9" receives only those
Power To Altar Incidents of the Shareholder's Status In Private Corpora-
tions, 21 ST. Louis L. REv. 12 (1935).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-20 (Supp. 1965).
" In the event a wife furnishes a portion of the purchase price of
securities held jointly with her husband, compliance with the privy examina-
tion requirements of § 55-12 of the General Statutes is not necessary. The
1957 General Assembly deleted any reference in that statute to the "personal
estate" of the wife. Moreover, as Professor Lee has pointed out, our supreme
court had previously held that the statute did not extend to transfers of
personalty by the wife to her husband. See 2 LEE § 110.
"o In the event of the simultaneous death of the joint tenants, § 3 of the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, codified in N.C. GEx. STAT. § 28-161.3
(Supp. 1965), provides that each tenant's pro rata share of the jointly held
property shall pass as though that tenant had survived. This method of
division conflicts with the usual dispositive scheme of the proposed statute,
which is based upon each tenant's contribution to the purchase price of the
securities. However, the difficulties that would be encountered in proving
respective contributions where all the joint tenants were dead are so great
that the application of the Uniform Act seems a practical solution. A
testator or settlor frequently makes a contrary provision with regard to
presumed survivorship, a right recognized by § 6 of the Uniform Act. N.C.
GEu. STAT. § 28-161.6 (Supp. 1965). One usually thinks of this presumption
as affecting only property that passes under the dispositive instrument in
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securities that were jointly owned at the time of the deceased tenant's
death and had not been partitioned between the parties or subjected
to claims of the deceased tenant's creditors during his lifetime. 7
Partition and segregation of a joint tenant's respective interest can
be by a voluntary sale or by partition proceedings under section
46-42 of the General Statutes. Upon such partitions, the tenants
are not entitled to pro rata distribution based upon their respective
legal interests, as in partition of a common law joint tenancy"s or
termination by divorce of a tenancy by the entireties. 9 Rather,
distribution between the parties is based upon their respective con-
tributions to the purchase price of the securities. A statutory pre-
sumption of equal ownership is applicable absent satisfactory proof
of unequal contributions. Thus, the distributive shares of joint
owners of corporate securities are determined by the same principles
found in the decisions of our supreme court relating to joint bank
accounts.1 00
Subsection (b) (2) governs the rights of the joint tenants inter
partes as to income from the securities, voting rights and transfer
of the securities. Since cash dividends or interest payments on
question. However, one writer has suggested that a properly drafted clause
could change the statutory presumption as to property that did not pass
under the instrument if it were presumed that the tenant or tenants other
than the testator or settlor survived. See 15 Wyo. L.J. 229 (1961).
' Upon death of a joint tenant, the survivor will seek transfer on the
books of the corporation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-59(e) (1965) permits, but
does not require, corporations to regard the surviving tenant or tenants as
absolute owner of the securities. Section 55-59(i) extends this authority
to the corporation's transfer agent and registrar, if any. However, under
§ 55-59(k), the corporation is not relieved from breach of any contract to
which it is a party in so acting. Joint registration under the proposed
statute would certainly constitute such a contract between the corporation
and the registered owners.
" See Skidmore v. Poplin, 261 N.C. 713, 136 S.E.2d 99 (1964); 63
C.J.S. Partition § 219 (1950).
" McKinnon, Currie & Co. v. Caulk, 167 N.C. 411, 83 S.E.2d 559 (1914).
"The two former spouses become equal cotenants, without inquiry as to
who paid the original purchase price of the property. Even though one of
the former spouses paid the entire purchase price, each becomes entitled to
an undivided one-half of the whole . . . ." 2 LEE § 120, at 94.
..0 See, e.g., cases cited in note 36 supra. The bank account statute does
not purport to affect the rights of the tenants inter partes during their joint
lives. See Smith v. Smith, 255 N.C. 152, 120 S.E.2d 575 (1961). N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-206 requires every person "owning" intangible personal prop-
erty to file an intangibles tax return. Shares of stock are specifically in-
cluded in such property by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-203. For the purposes of
this tax each tenant would report and pay tax on that share of the securities
to which he would be entitled on partition, or which his creditors could reach.
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corporate securities are usually not reinvested, such payments are
regarded in theory as a partition of that portion of the jointly owned
securities, so that each tenant is entitled to his separate proportionate
share of such payments. However, since stock dividends or divi-
dends in kind, such as corporate assets or securities in other corpo-
rations, usually continue to be owned by the parties, the statute
proposes that such accretions be, in effect, added to the original
securities and held as joint tenants. The exercise of voting rights
by the tenants will be governed by section 55-69(f) of the General
Statutes. That section provides that if only one joint tenant acts,
his act binds all, but if more than one act, the majority governs.
In case of even splits, the vote is also split.
Determining the proper interest of a joint tenant's creditors in
his share of the jointly owned property during his life necessitates
another major policy decision in drafting the statute. Should the
jointly-owned property be beyond the reach of creditors of an indi-
vidual tenant, as in the case of a tenancy by the entireties, 10 1 or
should the property be subject to such claims and, indeed, the ten-
ancy destroyed by execution on the property, as in the case of a
common law joint tenancy?1°2 Subsection (c) of the proposed
statute recognizes that tenancies established under its provisions are
subject to the laws relating to fraudulent conveyances. 03 However,
those remedies are frequently not available to creditors whose claims
arise after the creation of the tenancy."0 4 Therefore, in keeping with
the purposely ambulatory intent imputed to the parties under the
proposed statute, subsection (b) (3) provides that a tenant's pro-
portionate share of the securities are subject to his debts, regardless
of whether such debts arise before or after establishment of the
tenancy. However, to prevent a dissolution of the joint tenancy as
to all the securities upon a partition and sale at the instance of a
creditor as to only a portion of that tenant's interest in the securities,
the concluding sentence of subsection (b) (3) provides that any
securities remaining after a creditor's sale shall continue to be held
101 Grabenhoffer v. Garrett, 260 N.C. 118, 131 S.E.2d 675 (1963); 2 LEE
§ 116.
""Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 94 S.E.2d 466 (1956) (dictum);
4 T oMPsoN, op. cit. supra note 87, § 1780.
"I3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-15 (Supp. 1965).
... Aman v. Smith, 165 N.C. 224, 81 S.E. 162 (1914).
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as joint tenants. °5 Obviously, after such a sale, the share of the
debtor-tenant would be reduced proportionately.
Under the bank account statute, the deceased owner's pro rata
share of the unwithdrawn deposits in the joint account continues
after his death to be subject to his individual debts to the extent the
assets in his probate estate are insufficient to satisfy the same. 0 6
The depository institution must pay to the deceased depositor's legal
representative his pro rata share of the account and then may pay
the remainder to the surviving joint owner. 3 7 However, the amount
properly needed by the legal representative to satisfy governmental
and creditors' claims cannot be established with certainty until ad-
ministration of the estate has been completed or, arguably, until the
six-month period of notice to creditors has elapsed.' 8 Technically,
therefore, any remaining balance should not be paid to the surviving
depositor by the legal representative for a substantial period of time.
If the mechanics of the bank account statute were followed with
reference to corporate securities, the long and tedious process of
security transfer would be enormously complicated. Joint bank ac-
counts are widely used as a repository of cash reserves and, in the
case of persons of modest means, frequently constitute the only
sizable and readily accessible assets for the satisfaction of creditors'
claims. Creditors, therefore, have a substantial interest in the avail-
ability of bank accounts for satisfaction of their claims, even though
they have not been diligent in pursuing the debtor while he was
still alive. By contrast, few persons invest in corporate securities,
whether individually or jointly owned, without having cash reserves
that are reasonable in light of their financial circumstances and
105 Subsection (b) (3) of the proposed statute is comparable to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 41-2.1(b) (3) (Supp. 1965). Note, however, that the latter statute
does not expressly provide that the right of survivorship continues to attach
to the remaining account after a portion of a tenant's interest in the account
is subjected to the claims of his creditors.
'
0 0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1(b) (3) (Supp. 1965).
0The bank account statute as originally enacted included only accounts
between husband and wife. The 1963 General Assembly amended the statute
to make it applicable to deposit accounts "in the name of two or more
persons." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1(a) (Supp. 1965). Prior to this amend-
ment, the statute's provision in subsection (b) (3) relating to post-mortem
creditors' rights merely stated that "upon the death of either husband or
wife, the survivor becomes the sole owner of the entire unwithdrawn deposit
subject to the claims of the creditors of the deceased and to governmental
rights."1*8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-47 (Supp. 1965).
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readily available for satisfaction of creditors' claims. Creditors,
therefore, have less justifiable interest in being permitted to pursue
jointly held securities for satisfaction of their claims after the death
of a joint tenant than in having available to them joint bank ac-
counts. Perhaps because of this analysis, only two jurisdictions
apparently have enacted statutes subjecting jointly owned securities
to the deceased tenant's debts."0 9 Weighing these considerations,
the proposed statute does not recognize any right of creditors of a
deceased tenant to satisfy their claims out of the jointly held securi-
ties.
Under the North Carolina inheritance tax laws, the death of a
joint tenant constitutes a taxable event to the surviving joint tenant
to the extent the deceased tenant furnished a portion of the purchase
price of the securities." 0 Accordingly, subsection (d) provides that
the inheritance tax laws, especially sections 105-11 and 105-24 of
the General Statutes, are applicable to joint tenancies created under
the proposed statute."'
Finally, subsection (e) of the proposed statute recognizes that
joint tenancies in corporate securities may be established in ways
other than those set forth in subsections (a) and (f). Thus, the
door remains open for judicial recognition of a valid joint tenancy
where the parties have agreed that securities registered in only one
of their names shall be held jointly inter partes. However, given
practical statutory means for creation of a joint tenancy, such secret
agreements should not be encouraged by recognition thereof in the
statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
Possibly no fact illustrates so well the expansion of the Ameri-
can economy and the increased individual wealth of our citizenry as
the large increase in the number of persons holding corporate securi-
ties. With this increase has come a proliferation of problems re-
"' S.B. 338, Wash. Sess. Laws 1965; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.48 (Supp.
1965).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105.2(9) (1965); 32 N.C. Opp. A' ry GEN. 189
(1954). See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
"I1 Transfer agents generally require inheritance tax waivers before trans-
ferring corporate securities, whether or not registered in joint names. Since
under most wills the executor is required to pay all inheritance tax from the
residue, he would normally be the applicant for the waiver. If he refused to
do so, however, the surviving tenant would seek the waiver, to be granted
by the Commissioner under whatever terms he might see fit.
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lating to the ownership of securities. More and more frequently,
the attorney, the corporate fiduciary and the stockbroker find them-
selves forced to deal with jointly held securities or with persons
desiring to own securities jointly. Questions are inevitably raised
as to the type of estate created and its incidents. To those questions
the North Carolina attorney can give only tentative and qualified
answers.
Definitive answers to the problems raised by joint ownership
of corporate securities may be achieved by two routes. Interested
parties may await a decision from our supreme court, hoping for
clarification and solution of the problem. Such a case, however, may
not be soon in coming and the decision when rendered may not com-
pletely answer the questions raised in daily practice. The better
route, in the authors' opinion, is to seek legislative action. To this
end, this article has suggested a proposed statute for enactment by
the General Assembly of North Carolina. The authors recognize
that the suggested solution presented herein involves several policy
decisions on which there will be differences of opinion, such as
whether the ownership should be pro rata or proportionate to con-
sideration furnished, or whether or not a creditor should be able
to reach the interest of a deceased tenant. They urge, however,
that some legislative action be taken to alleviate the present prob-
lems involved in the creation of joint tenancies of corporate securi-
ties and to define more clearly the incidents of such ownership.
